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THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES INVOLVED IN DEALING 
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADA.TION; 
A Dynamic Approach 
Strong Versus Weak Uncertainties 
Fron1 a public policy standpoint, the issues of environmental 
degradation are unique in that they involve making decisions 
under conditions of "strong uncertainties, " No one can 
calculate in probabilistic terms either the risks to societies of 
environmental degradation or .the costs that will be encountered to 
bring about a lower rate. With respect to the risk, there is no way 
of calculating to what e;.._-tent the lives of people might be shortened by 
living in a densely populated and multifariously polluted city such as 
Los Angeles. Physicians have only a very rough idea of how 
respiratory and heart diseases are affected by certain kinds of 
contaminants. However, the more that is learned about the risks 
of environmental degradation, the more serious they do appear. 
This has been proven true with·respect to radioactivity as well as 
with respect to cigarette smoking, And there is no reason to suppose 
it will not be true with respect to other pollutants. 
This is not to suggest that because precise calculations cannot 
be made people behave irrationally if they take action to protect their 
own health, The fact of the matter is that, while some engineers and 
economists will deny any affect can occur unless it can be measured, 
when it comes to health, people have no alternative but to be re�ourceful 
on the basis �f highly ambiguous evidence. Although good estimates 
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are not obtainable, I would guess that a very significant part of the 
outmigration from Los Angeles and other cities having similar polluti 
problems during the past several yea�·s was provoked by the effect of 
smog on health -- and mo·re often than not, upon the advice of a physi• 
Physicians may not know a great deal about the effects of pollution on 
health. Yet, they cannot very well advise their patients to wait until 
better knowledge is available. While there are economic risks involv 
in acting upon the basis of imperfect knowledge, for particular 
individuals there are ;nore dangerous risks in waiting until good 
mortality data are available. A world of weak uncertainties can be 
defined as one having good mortality data -- and, more generally 
speaking, as a world which can be described in probabilistic terms. 
In such a world it would be possible to obtain insurance against 
pollution, However, i£ such insurance is not available, people have 
no alternative but to balance the risks of continuing to live in a pollut. 
area with those of resettling in a healthier environment. 
Nor is it possible for public officials to be oblivious to the 
risks of environmental degradation, They may or may not be sensiti· 
to the in1pact of pollution on health, But public officials are very 
sensitive to the impact upon the future tax base of a continued 
outmigration fro1n a polluted area. In fact, I happen to know as a. 
niatter of firsthand knowledge that, on the basis of very scanty 
information about the reasons for the recent outmigration from the 
Los Angeles area, a number of political and business leaders saw 
in the threat of widespread pollution a real dilemma for the city. 
To sum up this part of the discussion: When uncertainties 
are strong, risks cannot be calculated in probabilistic terms, Or 
to put the proposition the other way around, ii the uncertainties were 
weak, which indicates they could be calculated in probabilistic terms 
people could insure themselves against living in high pollution areas 
as they insure themselves against airplane accidents; and there woul 
be no risks of living in high pollution areas. 
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People would si1nply have to decide whether or not living in a polluted 
area was worth the additional insurance premium. Governments might, 
of course, decide upon specific re1nedies to reduce the rate of environmental 
degradatiori. Ent if they did, it would be because it would cost less to 
save a polluted area than to allow it to die. 
Nor is it possible to make .good predictions of the longer-run 
costs likely to be involved in reducing environmental degradation. 
How rapidly the risks of environmental degradation are reduced 
obviously will depend on how imaginative business firms are in 
developing better menus of alternatives. To be sure, business firms 
n-iay search for relatively minor advances that call for little imagination, 
in which case the costs involved in reducing environmental degradation 
would be highly predictable. But the rate of progress probably would 
be very slow, Conversely, the advances calling for the greatest 
degree of imagination would be the least predictable. The 
reason for this is that imagination, if efficiently employed, leads to 
more significant ideological mutations -- mutations which must be 
defined as highly unpredictable. For example, it would have been 
easier' to predict the measures the American automobile industry has 
adopted to dale than it would have been to predict the stratified charge 
engine developed by the Honda Corporation. And the reason is very 
clear: from the point of view of permitting better fuel consumption 
and better emissions performance the statified charge engine represents 
a more impressive mutation, 
What, then, determines whether business firms are likely 
to employ relatively little or a great deal of imagination in searching 
for better alternatives? The answer is: the degree of risk firms impose 
upon each other. As Chart I shows, in an industry such as the computer 
industry the <!dvances represented by the stratified charge engin'e would 
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not be looked upon as la1·ge, In that industry, engaging in a high degree 
of unpredictable behavjor can be regarded as a routine activity. In 
fact, as Chart I shows, the advances follow upon each other so regularly 
the industry can be described as a "predictably unpredictable" industry 
engaged in the making of "fast history." It is no accident, however, 
that the computer industry happens to be one in which competitors 
impose large risks upon each other,' as measured in terms of the 
markets which can be won or lost with the introduction of new computers. 
It is quite unlikely for an industry as a whole to behave in a predictably 
unpredictable manner while overcoming large discontinuiti(�S unless 
the firms impose large risks upon each other. After all, unless 
prodded by competitors, why else would firms continue to deal with 
large technological risks? 
What, then,· prodded Honda into taking a large technological 
risk? One obvious reason is that Honda is not a typical automobile 
firm. It originated as a bicycle firm and only recently entered the 
automobile business. Therefore, it is not likely to have the inflexible 
organizational structure associated with an American auton1obile firm, 
whose structure sharply limits the ability to engage in a higher degree 
of unpredictable behavior. For ex
.
ample, Honda engineers, working 
at Ford (Detroit) on the development of a stratified charge engine, 
argue that they are surprised anything new is ever accomplished in 
the American automobile industry. They point to the fact that in Japan 
on the basis of rough drawings they can obtain parts from general 
Japanese machinists in a matter of a few day!l, but at Ford, _where 
specialized machinists can only work from highly detailed drawings, 
the same process can take months . Furthermore, Honda may 
. not only have an organizational structure which is more consonant 
with risk-taking, because it permits a higher degree of unpredictable 
behavior, but"it also may hav� a greater incentive to engage in 
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risk-taking. If foreign manufacturers hope to co1npete in American 
markets they must have something special to sell. For only trivial 
differences in gasoline consumption the American consumer will not 
change his attachment fron1 an American to a foreign product. 
To conclude this part of the discussion: Viewed as isolated 
events, individual advances in technology are quite unpredictable, But 
a series of impressive advances can be made quite predictable when 
business firn1s impose a substantial degree of risk upon each other, 
Since the uncertainties are strong, they obviously cannot take out 
insurance against such competitive ris.ks. They must, therefore, 
hire imaginative people to do to their competitors what their competitors 
can do to them! And it is the diversity of idea.s generated, because 
competitors cannot predict each others actions, which leads to smooth 
progress when plotted on a n1acroscale. Thus, :microdiversity is the 
hidden hand of macrostability, 
Why, then, are the issues of the environment to be considered 
as dynamic issues? As the terms are usually defined, a "static processn 
is one in which the initial conditions can be taken as givens, and a 
"dynan1ic process" is one which involves unpredictable changes in the 
initial conditions. If this definition is accepted, then the environmental 
issues must be regarded as "dynamic issues" for all time to come. 
First, as was already pointed out, as man learns more about the risks 
of environmental degradation, it seems quite likely he will discover 
effects which cannot be predicted today. Moreover, as human 
evolution continues, ne\v interactions with the physical and biological 
environments will result in the discovery of new risks {as it has since 
the Middle Ages). Second, growth will wear out technologies from an 
environmental point of view; and the more rapidly economi.es attempt 
to grow, the greater will be the need for dynamic behavior. Third, 
if effective action is to be taken to bring about smooth progress to 
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reduce the risks of e nvironmental degradation, then a high degree @f 
unpredictable behavior will be required to generate a diversity of ideas. 
Very unfortunate from a public policy point of view is that the 
industries which contribute 1nost to the problems of the environment, 
the automobile, petroleum and electric power industries -- industries 
for whom stable growth has become almost a religion -- are those 
\vhose ability to engage in dynamic behavior is not very impressive, 
Furthermore, as far as the United States .is concerned, the automobile 
and related industries are responsible for about one-sixth oi its total 
l employment, Therefore, industrial spokesmen are in a good position 
to argue that "what is good for General Motors is good for the U. S, A, " 
Or as Keynes once made the point: When you owe the bank one thousand 
pounds, the bank owns you, But when you owe the bank one million 
pounds, you own the bank! 
What, then, are the policy options for dealing with environmental 
degradation? One is the internalization of costs: a prescription which 
has emerged from classical economic theory. Another is the policy 
which is being followed by most countries: a policy of direct regulation. 
And finally, there is a policy which can be described as "risk internalization." 
Its. aim is to make business firms feel (because of their profits) the risk 
of not reducing environmental degradation at a more rapid rate. 
However, while the last proposal is based upon dynamic economic 
theory, 2 it certainly is not new. In fact, the concept of risk internalization 
was proposed in a somewhat different context in 1827 by an engineer 
who, as it happens, is also credited with the �ey ideas contained in the 
second law of thermodynamics, Sadi Carnot, 
The !nternalization of Costs 
If it is assumed that an economic system is closed, in t�e sense 
that its, knowledge can be taken as a given, and if it is further assumed 
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that all people are more or less equal\y affected by environmental 
degradation, then the logic of the proposal which comes out of classical 
economic theory is unassailable. "Internalization of costs'' means, 
in effect, that the polluters would be made to take into account the costs 
they are imposing upon society; and expenditures on improving the 
environment would be increased until the marginal benefits became 
equal to the marginal costs. One problem, as already was indicated, 
is that neither the costs nor the benefits are probabilisticly known. 
Another is that, even if they were, people arc affected differently. And 
this, in turn, means that the arnount to be spent on pollution abatement 
is not an econon1ic but a political decision, 
The advice economists are qualified .to give concerns the most 
efficient means of bringing about reductions in the risks of environmental 
degradation, And by pretending they can give advice on both the 
resources to be devoted to pollution abatement.and the means for 
bringing about an appropriate reduction in pollution, economists end 
up by laying down pompous preconditions which have little or no 
operational content. 
Direct Regulation 
If it were possible to utilize relatively known technology to 
quickly clean up the environment, then direct regulation probably would. 
be the most efficient way to get the job done. Providing that a centralized 
planning bureau could collect the 
_
same information as a decentralized 
planning process, then there would be no inherent advantage in 
decentralized decision making. 
The problem with direct regulation is that the relevant 
information cannot be obtained from a centralized plannin.g system, 
To be sure, in principle, at least, it should be possible to obtain good 
information about the impact of environmental degradation on health 
9 
and about measures to lower the rate of environmental degradation, 
But, while l·esponsivcness to feedback makes for a good cybernetic 
system, it is not the essence of dynamic behavior. The essence of 
dynamic behavior is the ability to generate new alternatives. And the 
only way a centralized p.lanning agency could acquire a rea
_
listic 
knowledge of the alt<:'rna1.iv<'s is by promoting active competition between 
business firms. Unless husiness firms are confronted with real risks, 
how can a realistic knowledge of the alternatives be acquired? 
Because regulation is not ordinarily defined as the promotiOn 
of competition, regulatory agencies have tended to represent deplorably 
inefficient instruments from a dynamic point of view, One reason is 
that the response of such organizations in adjusting to new circumstances 
inclines to be just above zero. This slow reaction occurs hecause in 
the process of promulgating a particular regulation the regulatory 
agency and the regulatory industry tend to become a coalition whose 
main objective in life is to prevent the regulation from being changed, 
As far as the United States is concerned, regulatory agencies are 
staffed mainly by lawyers. And, on the whole, lawyers tend to be 
strict constitutionalists who, once a regulation is promulgated, can 
be counted upon to resist all future efforts to change it. By contrast, 
an efficient dynamic system is one which possesses a significant 
degree of "openness": a real ability to interact with an environment 
to change the entire system -- man1s ideas plus his physical cnvironrnent. 
Quite obviously, ideological change must go hand in hand with changes 
in the physical environment. But, because o� the constraints they 
impose upon ideological change, regulatory agencies tend to have a 
low degree of dynamic efficiency. 
The second problem with regulatory agencies is that the 
incentives the'y provide to industry are perverse. As was pointed out, 
to make smo ... th progress when reducing envirorunental risks requires 
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the generation of a wide diversity of ideas, However, the incentives 
provided by regulation are inclined to promote consonance of behavior: 
the regulated industry obviously has an incentive to get the regulation 
postponed; consequently, from that point of view it is necess_ary to 
present a united front to the regulatory agency. And it is not entirely 
an accident that despite its large R&D expenditures the American 
automobile industry has featured a low diversity of ideas with respect 
to reducing pollution -- even in the absence of regulation, it is not 
an industry known for risk-taking. Unfortunately, instead of 
counteracting such a tendency regulatio� reinforces it. 
\Vhile regulation does make possible some degree of progress, 
it is a terribly slow and inefficient way of bringing it about. It is 
slow because of the small degree of openness typically associated with 
regulatory agencies. It is expensive because it f.eatures the generation 
of a low diversity of ideas. The only way to make progress smoothly 
and ine:xpensivcly is by having a variety of options from which to choose. 
And the only "'·ay regulation can contribute to this result is by the 
promotion of competition. 
The Internalization of Risks 
As applied to business competition, the term "internalization 
of risks" means acting upon a technological risk to avoid a market 
risk. In a \Vorld in which new discoveries can be made, competitors 
face two risks: a cotnpetitive risk and a technological risk. And acting 
to avoid a competitive risk internalizes a tech."lological risk in the 
sense that it makes the future rate of progress more predictable, 
Thus, risk internalization consists of competitors imposing a tax 
upon each other -- the bigger the tax, the more rapid is like'ly to be 
the rate of progress, because the bigger the tax, the greater the 
incentive to engage in unpredictable behavior in overcoming discontinuities 
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by generating new ideological mutations, 
Once the logic of internalizing risks is understood, it quickly 
becomes apparent that co1npclition provides only one way of internalizing 
risks, As another illustration, consider rate-making procedures in 
the field of long distance and international telephone calls. Here, due 
to the long lag in reducing telephone rates in response to reductions 
in costs, it really paid AT&T to stay ahead of the ratemakers in 
discovering ways to reduce costs. And as Chart II shows, the telephone 
system did a good job of staying ahead of the ratemakers. 
In very general terms, risk internalization can be compared 
to a tax that contains both positive and negative incentives: rewards 
for achievers and punishments for slackers. An increase in the· taJ{ 
implies, therefore, a stren�thening of both positive and negative 
incentives (i. e. , a more differentiated reward system). Risk 
internalization provides a society with a dyn<. mic insurance policy: 
assuming there arc six to eight firms in an industry, progress will be 
smooth. And the rate will depend upon the degree to which risks are 
internalized: the greater the "premiums" -- then1ore differentiated the 
reward system -- the n1ore rapid t_he rate of progress. 
More generally speaking, the objective in internalizing risks is 
to increase the degree of o penness by making income after taxes depend on 
performa ce in in1proving producti.vity, however it is measured. And 
as the following quotation indicates, Sadi Carnot was familiar with the 
logic of the argwnent: 
A tax on the rent of a farm would be much better than a t"ax 
on the land itself. Proprietors then could only avoid taxes 
by themselves improving their property. As it is, they 
merely collect the rents, and usually employ their surplus 
in unproductive expenditure, while the propietary farmers 
devote theirs to the improvement of the land. 3 
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Apparently in the days Carnot wrote, a tax on land was 
on its raw (unimproved value), while the rent of land was on its 
improved value. 1£ these assumptions are made, a tax on land 
would provide no incentive to improving it. But a tax on rent 
would provide an incentive to becorne a propietary farmer, and 
to increase the value of the land, Thus, it is quite clear that Carn 
Carnot had in mind a tax scheme aimed at increasing the degree 
of risk internalization. 
13 
Because the minds of most economists are to this day ruled 
by equilibrium economics, it is to be eXpected that they will not �avor 
risk internalization schemes. However, it must be kept in mind that 
the issue is not one 0£ regulation versus no regulation. It is, rather, 
an issue of what kind of regulation: direct regulation which would 
provide perverse incentives for the generation of a diversity of ideas 
and a risk internalization scheme which would provide positive incentives. 
In one sense, a system of regulation does provide positive 
incentives. Legally speaking, the penalty of failing to meet the standards 
is a 100 percent excise tax. For e:{ample, an automobile company 
could be prevented from selling cars. But, practically speaking, the 
threat to escalate to full scale antipollution war would not be a credible 
threat, because in an industry in which mil.lions of jobs might be 
affected no one would believe the threat, 
Actually, it is no small wonder peopl� in industry often 
proclaim, "We can live with regulation. 1' What they mean is that 
they can engage in effective lobbying to get the regulations postponed, 
On the other hand, it is also easy to understand why direct regulations 
are very popular with politicians, The tough language contained in 
the laws makes good reading n:iaterial for their constituents. In fact, 
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if politicians want to be popular with both the public at large and 
business interests, the optimal policy is to carry a big stick but never 
use it. Another good example is to be found in recent measures taken 
in the United States to tighten the cri1ninal penalties associated with 
the antitrust laws, Not only is the effect to make prosecution more 
difficult, but the politician can tell his constituents he favors.a 
competitive society! 
The advantage of incentive schemes over direct regulation is 
that they supply a more plausible threat when it comes to the ii:iternalization 
of risks, In order to internalize risks it is essential to adopt measures 
which will have a more or less calculable effect on business profits. 
Business firn1s must be left with no uncertain.ty that their profits after 
taxes will be larger if they display improved perfor�ance in reducing 
pollution. 
Present regulation takes the form of the imposition of more 
and more stringent standards. There is nothing wrong with this general 
form of regulation. For the indefinite future there ought to be pressure 
on firms to discover ways to lower the rate of environmental degradation. 
Why environmental taxes provide ?- more efficient method of regulation 
than direct controls is that whereas the first provides incentives to 
make technologi.cal discoveries to avoid the tax, the latter provides 
incentives to make political discoveries to escape from regulation. 
This is not to say, of course, that with risk internalization 
measures, the problem of cr'eating perverse incentives would be 
completely o·bviated. For example, if an emissions tax was levied on 
automobiles only on the basis of emissions data obtained from newly 
manufactured cars, then it would be expected that automobile 
tnanufacturers would not put their best efforts into the de".elopment of 
enrissions devices which were relatively easy to maintain. Indeed, 
this is already a problem. Therefore, to avoid this kind of perversity, 
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an inspection scheme with a supplemental system of penalties would 
be required. Such measures would not, of course, please the consumer. 
But only by making the consumer feel the risk can automobile firms 
be motivated lo dcvC'lop emissions systems which would be easier to 
maintain. However, while such difficulties are inherent in.all types 
of environmental taxes -- whether on automobiles or newly constructed 
houses -- usually such perverse effects are worse with direct regulation. 
Nor do I want to imply there would be no difficulties in designing 
appropriate tax incentives. One difficulty is that of obtaining reasonably 
accurate 1neasurcments on the improvements in the performance of a 
technology from an environmental point of view. However, this is a 
difficulty which must be faced with any type of regulation, Another 
difficulty is that of deciding at what level to set the rates. It can be 
assumed that if the taxes w�re progressively raised a level would be 
reached which elicited the appropriate degree of openness. However, 
given the inflexibility of tax systems when it comes to raising rates, 
it obviously would be desirable to be able to make predictions on the 
responsiveness of firms to increased degrees of risks in tht0ir 
environment. But to make predictions which might be accurate within 
a factor of two will require a good deal of empirical research. 
The real constraint on the adoption of risk internalization 
measures is not, however, a lack of research. Generally speaking, 
policy oriented research in the social sciences has not preceded the 
adoption of new policies; rather, it has followed, Thus, with one or 
two exceptions, econon1ists in the United Stat�s did not become 
interested in the promotion of competition until Jong after the antitrust 
laws were adopted. And before Keynes argued that a mere reduction 
in wages would not restore the economy to a heavenly equilibrium, 
both the British and American governments were engaged in deficit 
financing. The real constraint is the attitude held in a number of 
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countries that it is the responsibility of govern1nents to spare their 
citizens fron1 risk-taking. The good life, politicians have come to 
believe, is life in which economic growth is so stable that no 
unpredictable event dares to occur. To be sure, biologists and 
psychologists now believe that people differ greatly in their propensities 
for security and adventure. 5 And, if this argument is correct, then 
there is nothing wrong with imposing a higher degree of risk on 
business firn1s and labor unions -- for the result would simply be 
that a different type of personality was favored, When economic 
policies favor n1icrostability, the people \vho get to the top of business 
firms are lawyers and accountants -- people who are trained to perform 
the same function in modern societies as geneti� inbreedin� performed 
in medieval societies. On the other hand, when they favor macrostabi1ity 
-- smooth progress accompanied by a high degree of unpredictable 
microbehavior -- people with a greater degree of openness are favored, 
as measured by tolerance of ambiguity tests. 
This distinction between the two types of people was once 
described by Thomas Jefferson as the ''artificial" and the "natural'' 
aristocracy. The principal differen�e, therefore, between a policy 
of direct regulation and one of risk internalization is that whereas 
the former favors the artifical aristocracy, the latter favors the natural 
aristocracy. In fact, the willingness of people to impose risk internalization 
n1e·asures on themselves can be regarded as a necessary condition for 
the preservation of democratic societies. The test of a democratic 
society, it n1ay be assu1ned, is to sUrvive in the face of trying 
circumstances by making good use of its natural aristocracy. But 
unless if is willing to impose tough :risk internalization measures, how 
can a society meet this test? The basic reason, therefore, for adopting 
a dynamic approach is that it allows us to understand the logic of risk 
internalization. 
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